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Cicchini: Prosecutorial Reduction in Burden of Proof

SPIN DOCTORS: PROSECUTOR SOPHISTRY AND THE BURDEN
OF PROOF
Michael D. Cicchini*

Spin Doctor: “a person employed . . . to use spin in interpreting
information or events so as to present them in a favorable light.”1
Sophistry: “the use of fallacious arguments, especially with the
intention of deceiving.”2
Prosecutors have developed several tactics to effectively lower the
burden of proof in criminal trials. One such tactic is to argue to jurors
that they should “search for the truth” of what they think happened. Some
trial courts are complicit in this effort, and formally instruct jurors “not
to search for doubt” but instead “to search for the truth.” Defense
lawyers have objected to these truth-based arguments and instructions,
as such language improperly lowers the burden of proof below the
reasonable doubt standard. Prosecutors, however, have dismissed these
objections as pure speculation.
In response to this apparent call for evidence, Dr. Lawrence T. White
and I empirically tested the effect of these truth-based jury instructions
on verdicts. In two recently published studies, mock jurors who received
truth-based instructions convicted at significantly higher rates than those
who were simply instructed on reasonable doubt. Jurors who received the
truth-based instructions were also far more likely to mistakenly believe it
was proper to convict even if they had a reasonable doubt about guilt.
Citing this empirical evidence, defense lawyers have been asking trial
courts to remove truth-related language from their burden of proof jury
instructions, and to prohibit prosecutors from making search-for-truth
arguments to jurors. Prosecutors, however, have responded by attacking
the validity of the two published studies.
This Article identifies and debunks these prosecutorial attacks. Its
purpose is to assist defense lawyers and judges in recognizing and
responding to invalid prosecutorial arguments, many of which are based
on a gross misunderstanding of scientific research, blatant

* Criminal Defense Lawyer, Cicchini Law Office, LLC, Kenosha, Wisconsin. J.D., summa cum laude,
Marquette University Law School (1999); C.P.A., University of Illinois Board of Examiners (1997);
M.B.A., Marquette University Graduate School (1994); B.S., University of Wisconsin—Parkside (1990).
I am grateful to Lawrence T. White, Ph.D., for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. Spin
Doctor,
Slang,
COLLINS
DICTIONARY,
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/spin-doctor.
2. Sophistry, DICTIONARY, https://www.google.com/search?q=Dictionary#dobs=sophistry.
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misrepresentations of fact or law, and, most significantly, logical
fallacies. Debunking these prosecutorial arguments is a critical step in
protecting every person’s right to remain free of conviction unless the
state can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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INTRODUCTION
In theory, the prosecutor’s burden in a criminal case is to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.3 However, prosecutors have developed
numerous tactics to effectively lower this burden of proof. One common
ploy is to argue to jurors that they should not focus on their doubts, but
rather they should search for the truth of what they think happened. Many
courts recognize that this argument is improper, as it urges jurors to apply
a mere preponderance of evidence standard. Other courts, however, take
the opposite approach: they are complicit in the prosecutor’s burdenlowering effort by formally instructing jurors “not to search for doubt”
but instead “to search for the truth.”4
Defense lawyers have long objected to this truth-related language in
burden of proof jury instructions. Prosecutors responded that there was
no evidence to support defense lawyers’ objections. Given this response,
Lawrence T. White and I conducted and published two controlled
experiments testing the effect of truth-versus-doubt language on mock
juror decision-making. Our findings demonstrated, among other things,
that jurors who were told “not to search for doubt” but instead “to search
for the truth” convicted at significantly higher rates than those who were
properly instructed on reasonable doubt.5
In light of this empirical evidence, defense lawyers have asked trial
judges to modify their burden of proof jury instructions by deleting the
3. See Part I.
4. See Part II.
5. See Part III.
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offending truth-versus-doubt language. Now that defense lawyers are
providing the evidence that prosecutors previously claimed did not exist,
prosecutors have shifted gears by attacking the empirical research in an
effort to preserve the burden-lowering jury instructions on which they rely
to convict.6
Some of these prosecutorial claims, criticisms, and arguments may
have superficial appeal to a trial judge who is untrained in behavioral
research. Thus, this Article identifies and debunks the most recent
prosecutorial spin regarding the published studies. This latest line of
sophistry includes claims of experimenter and participant bias,7 criticisms
of study design,8 misrepresentations regarding the studies’ findings,9
outright fabrications about other aspects of the studies,10 and, most
significantly, the reliance on several logical fallacies. 11
The Article concludes by reminding courts of the big picture: even
without empirical research on this topic, the Constitution requires jurors
to examine the prosecutor’s evidence for reasonable doubt. Therefore,
courts must not adopt burden of proof instructions—or allow prosecutors
to make closing arguments—that in any way suggest, or even hint, that
jurors should apply a lower or different standard of proof.
I. Gaming the Burden of Proof
Prosecutors have an ethical duty as a “minister of justice,” which
includes ensuring that a defendant “is accorded procedural justice.”12 Few
things are more important to procedural justice than ensuring jurors are
applying the correct burden of proof. In criminal cases, the Constitution
protects a defendant from conviction unless the prosecutor proves the
state’s case “beyond a reasonable doubt.”13 The Supreme Court has
equated this high level of proof with jurors having “a subjective state of
near certitude” about the defendant’s guilt.14 Yet, despite their ethical
obligations, many prosecutors have gone to great lengths to lower or even
shift the burden of proof, thus increasing their odds of winning a
conviction.
6. See Part IV.
7. See Parts IV.A. and IV.B.
8. See Part IV.C.
9. See Part IV.D. and IV.E.
10. See Part IV.F.
11. See, e.g., Parts IV.G. and IV.H. Logical fallacies are at the heart of most of the prosecutorial
attacks on the published research.
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 3.8, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). These model rules
are adopted, often verbatim, in most states.
13. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
14. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979).
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The variations of this prosecutorial tactic are countless, but a few
examples will demonstrate the point. Sometimes, prosecutors will
trivialize the burden of proof, arguing to jurors that it is no different than
the standard they use when making decisions in their everyday lives.15
Other times, prosecutors will present jurors with a false dilemma by
arguing that, in order to acquit, they would have to find that the state’s
witnesses—often police officers—were intentionally lying under oath.16
In some cases, prosecutors will not just lower the burden of proof but
will actually shift the burden to the defendant. Examples include arguing
that the defendant is guilty because she decided not to testify, 17 failed to
call enough witnesses at trial,18 or did not present compelling evidence of
innocence.19 In other cases, prosecutors will completely abandon all
attempts at subtlety—even the pretense that verdicts should be based on
evidence—and will argue to the jury: “you have a gut feeling he’s guilty,
he’s guilty.”20
One of the most common prosecutorial ploys—and the one that is the
subject of this Article—comes straight from the politician’s playbook. To
demonstrate, first consider an example from the national stage. When
rushing to create legislation in 2001, politicians strained mightily to find
ten words that could be strung together in a semi-intelligible way to create
the acronym: USA PATRIOT. The result of their efforts—or possibly
their interns’ efforts—was an awkward mouthful: “Uniting and
15. See People v. Nguyen, 40 Cal. App. 4th 28, 36 (1995) (holding that the standard “you use
every day in your lives when you make important decisions, [including] decisions about whether you want
to get married,” is much lower than the reasonable doubt standard, as “33 to 60 percent of all marriages
end in divorce.”).
16. See United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 1978) (even if jury thought the
government’s witnesses “probably were telling the truth and that [defendant] probably was lying . . . the
evidence might not be sufficient to convict defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. To tell the jurors they
had to choose between the two stories was error.”); State v. Singh, 793 A.2d 226, 238 (Conn. 2002)
(“testimony may be in direct conflict for reasons other than a witness’ intent to deceive”).
17. See State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 585 (Tenn. 2014) (prosecutor began rebuttal argument
“by walking across the court room, facing Defendant, and declaring in a loud voice, while raising both
arms to point at and gesture toward Defendant, ‘Just tell us where you were! That’s all we are asking,
Noura!’”).
18. See Adams v. State, 566 S.W.2d 387, 387 (Ark. 1978) (prosecutor asked jury, “How many
witnesses did the defense put on for your consideration?”).
19. See United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir. 1997) (prosecutor argued to jury
that “the defendant has the same responsibility [as the government] and that is to present a compelling
case.”).
20. Randolph v. State, 36 P.3d 424, 430 (Nev. 2011) (emphasis added). This ethically-challenged
prosecutor ascended to the bench where he encountered more ethics-related problems. See Mauricio R.
Hernandez, Vegas Judge Had Long History of Prosecutorial Misconduct, THE IRREVERENT LAWYER
(May
31,
2017),
https://lawmrh.wordpress.com/2017/05/31/vegas-judge-had-long-history-ofprosecutorial-misconduct/. A different prosecutor made a similar but subtler argument: “We all know
better in our heart of hearts exactly what went on here. And when you know inside your heart of hearts,
you know we have met our burden of proof . . . .” People v. Max, 980 N.E.2d 243, 253 (Ill. Ct. App.
2012).
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Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.”21 Such branding allowed the Act’s
supporters to paint anyone opposing it as unpatriotic—even when such
opposition was rooted in a concern for constitutional rights, one of the
most patriotic stances a politician could take.
At first blush, this political example might not seem analogous to
prosecutorial tricks designed to lower the burden of proof. But just as
politicians hijacked the word “patriot” to label objectors as unpatriotic,
some prosecutors have used a similar tactic by hijacking the word “truth.”
That is, by equating their quest for a conviction with a noble search for
the truth, prosecutors not only align themselves with truth and justice,22
but simultaneously brand defense lawyers as obfuscators who are
attempting to hide the truth by creating doubt.23
II. Flying the Truth Flag
“[T]ruth and doubt are two separate concepts: truth refers to a judgment
about whether something happened; doubt refers to the level of certainty
in that judgment.”24 Therefore, in closing arguments to the jury, defense
lawyers essentially argue that the prosecutor’s evidence does not rise to
the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Prosecutors, on the other
hand, should be arguing—assuming the evidence supports such an
argument—that he or she has proved the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
But rather than meeting their burden of proof head on, many
prosecutors skirt their ethical obligations and the defendant’s
constitutional protections. Prosecutors do this by arguing that, instead of
evaluating the evidence for reasonable doubt, the jury should dispense
with the endeavor entirely. As one prosecutor explained it to a jury, “I ask
that you search for the truth. When you go back into that jury room, you
search for the truth, not . . . reasonable doubt.”25 On appeal, the court
condemned the prosecutor’s superficially-appealing argument:

21. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
22. Prosecutors are able to do this because, for a variety of reasons, they enjoy an unearned
reputational advantage straight out of the gate. See Abbe Smith, Can You be a Good Person and a Good
Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 355 (2001) (“Somehow, it is understood that prosecutors
have the high ground. Most people simply assume that prosecutors are the good guys, wear the white hats,
and are on the ‘right’ side.”).
23. Contrary to the general perceptions about prosecutors, defense lawyers suffer a disadvantage
with regard to reputation. See id. at 356 (“In a social climate that exalts crime control over everything
else, defenders are barely tolerated.”).
24. Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Truth or Doubt? An Empirical Test of Criminal
Jury Instructions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1144 (2016) [hereinafter Cicchini & White, Empirical Test].
25. State v. Berube, 286 P.3d 402, 411 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
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A criminal trial may in some ways be a search for truth. But truth is
not the jury’s job. And arguing that the jury should search for truth
and not for reasonable doubt both misstates the jury’s duty and
sweeps aside the State’s burden. The question for any jury is whether
the burden of proof has been carried by the party who bears it. In a
criminal case, the State must prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. The jury cannot discern whether that has occurred without
examining the evidence for reasonable doubt.26
Or, as a different appellate court explained, the phrase “‘seeking the
truth’ suggests determining whose version of events is more likely true,
the government’s or the defendant’s, and thereby intimates a
preponderance of evidence standard.”27 Such a low burden of proof, of
course, falls well below the constitutionally-mandated standard for
criminal cases.
But other courts disagree. And, to make matters worse, some trial
judges will even aid and abet prosecutors in their burden-lowering efforts.
For example, after explaining the concept of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, one judge instructed jurors to “[d]etermine what you think the truth
of the matter is and act accordingly.” 28 Similarly, other judges have
instructed jurors that, when reaching their verdict, they should “evolve
the truth,”29 “seek the truth,”30 “search for truth,”31 or “find the truth.”32
In some states, it is a handful of rogue judges who act as a “party to”
this prosecutorial “crime.” In other states, the problem is institutionalized.
One statewide jury instruction committee—a committee that is comprised
of sitting judges, nearly all of whom are former prosecutors33—uses a
pattern instruction that decimates the burden of proof. It caps off its
26. Id. at 411-12 (finding the prosecutor’s argument to be error but holding that, because “the
impropriety was easily curable, especially in light of the court's instructions,” defense counsel’s failure to
object waived the issue).
27. United States v. Gonzalez-Balderas, 11 F.3d 1218, 1223 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
28. State v. Dunkel, 466 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
29. United States v. Pine, 609 F.2d 106, 108 (3rd Cir. 1979).
30. Gonzalez-Balderas, 11 F.3d at 1223; see also State v. Weisbrode, 653 A.2d 411, 417 (Me.
1995) (“The court instructed the jury to seek truth . . .”); State v. Aleksey, 538 S.E.2d 248, 251 (S.C. 2000)
(“[I]nstructing the jury its ‘one single objective’ was ‘to seek the truth.’”); State v. Benoit, 609 A.2d 230,
231 (Vt. 1992) (“During jury instructions, the trial judge twice referred to a jury’s duty to ‘seek the
truth.’”).
31. Commonwealth v. Allard, 711 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Mass. 1999); see also People v. Walos, 229
A.D.2d 953, 954 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (instructing the jurors that the trial was a “search for the truth”);
State v. Needs, 508 S.E.2d 857, 866 (S.C. 1998) (instructing the jurors that they should be “in search of
the truth”) (emphasis omitted).
32. United States v. Gray, 958 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1992).
33. See Michael D. Cicchini, The Battle over the Burden of Proof: A Report from the Trenches, 79
U. PITT. L. REV. 61, 85-86, n. 131-36 (2017) [hereinafter Cicchini, Report from the Trenches].

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 4

496

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

already flawed discussion of reasonable doubt by specifically warning
jurors: “you are not to search for doubt. You are to search for the truth.”34
When defense lawyers have objected to this truth-related language—
whether used in a prosecutor’s argument, an instruction from the trial
judge, or both—the common prosecutorial rebuttal was that defense
lawyers’ concerns were merely “personal opinion,” unsupported by
evidence.35 In response to this call for evidence, psychology professor
Lawrence T. White and I decided to empirically test the truth-related
language that prosecutors contend has no burden-lowering effect, yet—
for reasons they cannot articulate—still fight vigorously to preserve.
III. The Empirical Evidence36
In our first study, we recruited participants to serve as mock jurors in a
hypothetical criminal case.37 Each juror received identical case summary
materials, including: the elements of the charged crime, a summary of the
witnesses’ testimony, and the lawyers’ closing arguments.38 Before
rendering their verdicts, however, jurors were randomly assigned to three
groups, each of which received a different instruction on the burden of
proof.39
We first hypothesized that truth and doubt were, in fact, two distinct
concepts, and that jurors who were instructed only to search for the truth
(“truth only”) would convict at a higher rate than jurors who were
properly instructed on reasonable doubt (“doubt only”). 40 The results
supported this hypothesis. Jurors who received a truth-only instruction
voted to convict 29.6% of the time, while jurors who received the legally
proper doubt-only instruction voted to convict 16% of the time.41
Next, we hypothesized that jurors who were first properly instructed on
reasonable doubt but then told “not to search for doubt” and instead “to
search for the truth” (“doubt-and-truth”) would convict at a higher rate
than jurors who received the legally proper doubt-only instruction.42 The

34. WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 140 (2017) (emphasis added). For the other three defects
in the instruction, see Michael D. Cicchini, Instructing Jurors on Reasonable Doubt: It’s All Relative, 8
CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 72 (2017).
35. See State’s Trial Court Memorandum, Wisconsin v. Yusuf, No. 2015-CF-911 (Cir. Ct.
Kenosha Cty. 2015) (on file with the author).
36. This Part, including the footnotes and table, is reproduced with minor modifications from
Cicchini, Report from the Trenches, supra note 33, at 68-70.
37. Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1150.
38. Id. at 1151.
39. Id. at 1152.
40. Id. at 1150.
41. Id. at 1154.
42. Id. at 1150.
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results also supported this hypothesis. The conviction rate for jurors who
received the doubt-and-truth instruction jumped back up to 29%—a rate
statistically identical to that of jurors who received no reasonable doubt
instruction whatsoever.43 The following table clearly conveys these
results:

Burden-of-Proof Instruction
A clearly unconstitutional “search for the
truth” instruction with no mention whatsoever
of beyond a reasonable doubt (truth only)
A legally proper beyond a reasonable doubt
instruction (doubt only)

An otherwise legally proper beyond a
reasonable doubt instruction that concludes
with a mandate “not to search for doubt” but
“to search for the truth” (doubt-and-truth)

Conviction
Rate
29.6%

16.0%

29.0%

In our second study,44 we conducted a conceptual replication45 of the
first study. To test the strength of our primary finding, we again
hypothesized that the doubt-and-truth instruction would produce a higher
conviction rate than a legally proper doubt-only instruction.46 Again, the
results supported this hypothesis. In the second study, the two conviction
rates were 33.1% (doubt-and-truth) and 22.6% (doubt only).47
Next, we hypothesized that jurors who received the doubt-and-truth
instruction would be more likely to mistakenly believe that conviction
was proper even if they had a reasonable doubt about guilt.48 This
hypothesis—tested through a post-verdict question—was supported by
the results. Jurors in the doubt-and-truth group were nearly twice as likely

43. Id. at 1155.
44. Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Testing the Impact of Criminal Jury Instructions
on Verdicts: A Conceptual Replication, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 22 (2017) [hereinafter Cicchini &
White, Conceptual Replication].
45. Regarding the importance of replication, see Stefan Schmidt, Shall We Really Do It Again?
The Powerful Concept of Replication is Neglected in the Social Sciences, 13 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 90, 91
(2009).
46. Cicchini & White, Conceptual Replication, supra note 44, at 28.
47. Id. at 30–31.
48. Id. at 28.
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as jurors in the doubt-only group to hold this mistaken belief (28% and
15%, respectively).49 We also found that, regardless of the group to which
jurors were assigned, jurors who held this mistaken belief were far more
likely to convict than jurors who properly understood the burden of proof
(54% and 21%, respectively).50
IV. Spin Cycle
The findings discussed above strongly support defense lawyers’ claim
that telling jurors “not to search for doubt,” but instead “to search for the
truth,” lowers the burden of proof below the constitutionally-mandated
standard. In response, prosecutors have unleashed a torrent of criticisms
aimed at discrediting the two studies. Their goal is to preserve the truthbased reasonable doubt instruction, which, in turn, permits them to
exacerbate its burden-lowering impact by repeating its message in closing
arguments to the jury.
When criticizing the published studies, many prosecutors have
demonstrated skill in the art of sophistry. They are masters at subtly
dropping multiple claims—claims that are always fallacious but
sometimes superficially appealing—into only one or two short sentences.
Unfortunately for defense lawyers, these criticisms are very much like
landmines: they are easy to lay, but difficult and time-consuming to
cleanup.
This Article will now debunk several prosecutorial criticisms of the
published studies—studies that empirically demonstrate the burdenlowering effect of the mandate “not to search for doubt” but instead “to
search for the truth.”
A. The Hypothesis Bias
The first step in behavioral research is to formulate a hypothesis that
can be empirically tested. Yet, prosecutors have found a way to spin even
this fundamental concept to the state’s advantage. With regard to the first
published study, one prosecutor argued that because it posited a
hypothesis, it was biased from its inception. The prosecutor elaborated:
The first problem is that the entire premise of the [study] was biased
from the start. The authors were not searching for the truth: they
were not looking to see what effect various instructions might have
in a mock trial situation. What they were searching for was evidence

49. Id. at 32.
50. Id.
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to back their contention that an instruction that urges jurors to search
for the truth will lead to more convictions than an instruction that
urges jurors to search for doubt.51
Before addressing the prosecutor’s argument that the study was “biased
from the start,” it is important to recognize that he also misrepresented the
substance of our work. (This is an excellent example of a prosecutor
subtly dropping multiple criticisms into a small space.) We did not
compare an instruction that urges jurors to search for truth with one that
“urges jurors to search for doubt.” Rather, one instruction in our study
was the pattern instruction as it is given to jurors. The other instruction
was identical, except that it deleted the last fourteen words: “you are not
to search for doubt. You are to search for the truth.”52
Neither of the instructions “urge[d] jurors to search for doubt.” To the
contrary, both went to great lengths to warn jurors that, if they had a
doubt, it was probably not a reasonable one and therefore should not be
used to acquit. Specifically, the instructions both warned jurors that a
doubt “based on mere guesswork or speculation,” or that arises “from
sympathy or from fear to return a verdict of guilt,” or that is used “to
escape the responsibility of a decision” is not a reasonable doubt.53 In
other words, both instructions “convey[ed] a message to the jurors: The
judge would not have presented so many ways in which the juror’s doubts
can be used improperly if this were not the main problem to avoid.”54
Returning, then, to the prosecutor’s primary criticism: he argued that
the study was “biased from the start” because we hypothesized that certain
language would increase the conviction rate or, alternatively stated,
would lower the burden of proof. In making this argument, he is likely
attempting to redirect a criticism that is often aimed at police and
prosecutors: confirmation bias. This phenomenon occurs when, for
example, a government agent decides early on that the suspect (or
suspect-turned-defendant) is guilty, and then seeks out information to
confirm this preexisting belief while ignoring or minimizing information
that contradicts it.55
However, confirmation bias in an uncontrolled setting, such as a police
investigation, is dramatically different than formulating a hypothesis and
51. Decision Re: Motion for Reconsideration of Decision Modifying Burden of Proof Jury
Instruction, Wisconsin v. Linde, No. 2016-CF-193 (Cir. Ct. Dodge Cty. 2017), at 2 (quoting the
prosecutor) [hereinafter “Decision Re: Motion”] (on file with the author).
52. Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1152-54.
53. Id. at 1153-54.
54. Lawrence Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About
Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 144 (1999).
55. See Mary Nicol Bowman, Mitigating Foul Blows, 49 GA. L. REV. 309, 329 (2015) (discussing
the prosecutorial win-at-all-costs mentality and citing several sources of confirmation bias).
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then empirically testing it in a double-blind controlled experiment.56 The
trial judge kindly gave the prosecutor the benefit of the doubt when he
responded: “[t]he State misunderstands research methodology.” 57
The judge then elaborated by explaining the concept of the null
hypothesis. “The null hypothesis is that . . . conviction rates should be
equal regardless of the instruction. Empirical proof must overcome the
presumption that the null hypothesis is true before an alternative
hypothesis can be accepted.”58 The judge concluded as follows: “[t]he
positing of hypotheses is not bias, but is the first step in scientific
investigation. The empirical results from sound methods are what inform.
If the empirical difference . . . is statistically significant, the null
hypothesis is rejected and the posited hypothesis is accepted.”59
Given the way scientific investigations proceed—by first stating
hypotheses and then testing them—the prosecutor’s argument, if
accepted, would also lead to an absurd conclusion: the mere existence of
a study would be evidence of its bias. It would then follow that all of the
findings from the social sciences (and the physical sciences, for that
matter) should be discarded not because of any identifiable
methodological flaw, but merely because the studies exist.
B. Random Sampling and Biased Jurors
Sometimes, prosecutors attempt to articulate specific methodological
flaws in the studies. However, such attempts are often the product of
scientific illiteracy or, in many cases, bad faith spin doctoring.
For example, one prosecutor argued that the studies are unreliable
because we did not recruit test participants through “random sampling,”
which the prosecutor claimed “is the foundation of valid empirical
research.”60 However, the same prosecutor then complained that the
studies were also unreliable because we failed to “weed-out those with
preconceived ideas.”61
56. Using online research platforms allows for double-blind studies that dramatically reduce, if
not eliminate, participant and experimenter biases. See Matthew J. C. Crump, et al., Evaluating Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk as a Tool for Experimental Research, 8(3) PLOS ONE e57410 2 (2013)
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0057410 (because “the experimenter
never directly meets or interacts with the anonymous participants, it minimizes the chance the
experimenter can influence the results.”).
57. Decision Re: Motion, supra note 51, at 3.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added). As discussed in both studies, the differences in conviction rates
between test groups were statistically significant. Statistical significance is measured by a statistic called
the p-value. The lower the p-value, the more confident we can be that the difference between two test
groups did not occur by chance. See Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1154-56.
60. Decision Re: Motion, supra note 51, at 4 (quoting the prosecutor).
61. Id. at 5 (quoting the prosecutor).
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The prosecutor’s first mistake was that he threw two mutually
exclusive complaints against the same metaphorical wall, hoping that at
least one would stick. He first criticized the studies because the
participants were not randomly selected; he then immediately shifted
gears, claiming that the participants were randomly selected but shouldn’t
have been. It is simply not possible to have both random sampling and
nonrandom sampling in the same study. The trial judge responded:
The . . . argument of the State is that the samples used by [Cicchini
& White] were not random . . . .62 The State then argues that the
sample that was used . . . should not have been random but the
participants should have been screened through a voir dire process
to weed-out those with pre-conceived ideas. If voir dire would have
occurred, the sample would have been biased based on the
subjective bias of the person(s) doing the voir dire (and striking
possible study participants) resulting in the study’s validity being
compromised by the subjectivity of those doing the voir dire.63
In other words, the prosecutor can’t have it both ways. His other
mistake was even more fundamental: he feigned concern about random
sampling and participant bias. In doing so, he confused two types of
studies: surveys and experiments. A survey uses a sample to forecast the
frequency of some characteristic—for example, support for marijuana
legalization—in the larger population.64 Therefore, it is very important
that survey participants are selected randomly in order to be
representative of the larger population.65
Experiments, on the other hand, are designed to detect differences
between two or more test conditions and seek to answer a different type
of question. For example, in our jury-instruction experiments, we were
interested in learning the answer to the research question: all else being
equal, will mock jurors who receive instruction A vote guilty more often
than those who receive instruction B?
Bias in experiments is still a concern, of course. But had the prosecutor
simply read the study that he was condemning, he would have learned
that participant bias in experiments (as opposed to surveys) is addressed
through random assignment (as opposed to random sampling). As we
explained in our original study:
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id. at 5-6 (italics omitted).
64. See BETH MORLING, RESEARCH METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY: EVALUATING A WORLD OF
INFORMATION 173 (2012) (discussing how sample selection is far more important for a survey, or
“frequency claim,” than it is for controlled experiments that seek to detect “associations and causes”).
65. See id.
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The virtue of random assignment is that, when used with large
numbers of study participants, it produces groups that are
statistically equivalent to each other in all respects. Each group has
roughly the same number of mock jurors, the same number of men
and women, the same number of well-educated and poorly educated
persons, and the same number of biased and unbiased individuals.
When test groups are statistically equivalent at the outset, receive
different jury instructions, and then convict at different rates, we can
be quite certain that the different conviction rates were produced by
the different jury instructions and not by personal characteristics of
the mock jurors in a particular group.66
Because the prosecutor launched mutually exclusive criticisms at the
same time and disregarded the text of the study he was condemning, this
set of criticisms fails.
C. The Case of the Missing Instructions
One prosecutor took issue with the two published studies because of
the way the mock jurors were instructed. He argued that the studies were
not reliable because, in real-life trials, jurors “are repeatedly instructed
not to convict unless the state has proved guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.”67 Specifically, he argued, “[t]his admonition is given (1) when
charges are announced, (2) after the enumeration of each element of the
charged offense, (3) immediately preceding the text Cicchini objects to,
and (4) in various additional instructions”68 such as “self-defense,”
“circumstantial evidence,” “where identification of defendant is in issue,”
and the “lesser included offense.”69
To recast the prosecutor’s claim in more scientific terms, he is
essentially arguing that the studies rated poorly in terms of “external
validity,” i.e., they failed to properly mimic features in real-world
criminal jury trials.70 External validity is one of four interrelated validities

66. Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1165. For further discussion of random
assignment, see Morling, supra note 64, at 251-52 (Random assignment “creates a situation in which the
experimental groups will become virtually equal . . . .”).
67. Michael Griesbach, Meeting the Challenge to Wisconsin’s Criminal Jury Instruction 140, WIS.
L.J. (Nov. 22, 2017), https://wislawjournal.com/2017/11/22/meeting-the-challenge-to-wisconsinscriminal-jury-instruction-140/.
68. Id. (enumeration added).
69. Id., n. 6.
70. See generally THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION:
DESIGN & ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS 70-71 (1979).
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that are used to evaluate controlled experiments.71 However, the
prosecutor’s multi-part complaint above does not come close to
establishing any deficiency in this criterion.
First, and in no particular order, the prosecutor argued that real-life
juries would have also been reminded of the reasonable doubt standard in
additional instructions—such as “self-defense,” “circumstantial
evidence,” “where identification of defendant is in issue,” and the “lesser
included offense”—that we failed to include for our test subjects. The fact
patterns used in our two experiments are discussed in great detail in the
published studies.72 Both cases involved allegations of sexual touching.
Not surprisingly, “self-defense” was therefore not an issue. Further, both
cases hinged on direct evidence without any “circumstantial evidence” at
all.73 Additionally, neither case included an “identification of [the]
defendant” issue because the first case involved two people who knew
each other, and the second case included a stipulation on identity. Finally,
neither case had facts supporting a “lesser included offense.” Thus, no
such instruction was provided to the mock jurors. Therefore, our test
participants did not receive these additional instructions because real-life
jurors would not have received them.
Second, the prosecutor accurately states that the concept of reasonable
doubt is explained in the jury instruction “immediately preceding the text
Cicchini objects to.” This is true, but it is a red herring. Why? Because
we tested the entire instruction, including the part that the prosecutor
claims was omitted. This would have been obvious had the prosecutor
merely skimmed the published study.74
Third, the prosecutor argues that, in real-life jury trials, reasonable
doubt is mentioned “after the enumeration of each element of the charged
offense.” While such substantive instructions do state that the prosecutor
must prove all of the crime’s elements beyond a reasonable doubt,75 they
71. See id. at 37-38.
72. See Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1150-51; Cicchini & White,
Conceptual Replication, supra note 44, at 28-29.
73. Many prosecutors request the circumstantial evidence jury instruction even when a case is
based entirely on direct evidence. This might be due to their failure to grasp the difference between direct
and circumstantial evidence, or it could be yet another burden-lowering prosecutorial ploy. That is,
prosecutors tend to like the instruction because, despite its reference to proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
it may have its own type of burden-lowering effect when it informs the jury: “It is not necessary that every
fact be proved directly by a witness or an exhibit.” WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 170 (2017).
74. See Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1152-54. Our second study was a
conceptual replication of the first, and the changes included, among other things, a different discussion of
reasonable doubt that immediately preceded the unconstitutional closing mandate. Despite this, we still
observed a statistically significant, burden-lowering effect of the closing mandate. See Cicchini & White,
Conceptual Replication, supra note 44, at 29-30.
75. See, e.g., WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 2110 (2018) (“If you are satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that all five elements of this offense have been proved, you should find the defendant
guilty.”).
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do not do so after “each element,” as the prosecutor claims. Nor do such
substantive instructions explain, discuss, or define reasonable doubt.
Rather, that is done, not surprisingly, in the burden of proof instruction
(which was the entire purpose and focus of our experiment). Therefore,
in the controlled experiments—which are necessarily abbreviated relative
to a lengthy jury trial—we provided jurors with the elements of the
charged crime. However, we identified the reasonable doubt standard in
the burden of proof instruction where the phrase is also defined and
explained.
Fourth, the prosecutor argues that real-life juries are also instructed on
reasonable doubt at the beginning of the trial “when charges are
announced,” and we did not include this type of introductory instruction
for our test participants. But when a real-life judge discusses reasonable
doubt at the beginning of trial, he or she does so by reading the full jury
instruction on the burden of proof,76 which also includes the offending
truth-related language. This is, of course, the exact instruction that we
tested. Had we included the instruction twice in such a relatively small
space—a compressed case summary in a controlled experiment—it likely
would have exacerbated its burden-lowering impact and the prosecutor
would be complaining about that instead. “As Roseanne Rosannadanna
used to say, ‘If it’s not one thing, it’s another.’”77
Amazingly, the prosecutor launched this multi-part criticism even
though we had already addressed these issues. In our first study, we
explained that our design was intentionally conservative and would
probably underestimate the impact of the truth-related language in the
jury instruction:
[J]urors were instructed only once on the burden of proof. Further,
in order to hold the case summary constant across groups, the
lawyers’ closing arguments did not include any reference to the . . .
burden of proof instructions tested. This, however, is dramatically
different than real-life trials where juries may be told as many as five
times “not to search for doubt,” but instead “to search for the truth.”
The burden of proof instruction is often given verbally before
opening statements, again before closing arguments, and then in
writing for the jury’s reference during deliberations. Even more
harmful, during closing arguments a prosecutor may parrot the

76. See WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 50 (2017) (listing preliminary instructions, including
pattern jury instruction no. 140 on the burden of proof which is to be read right before the judge announces
that “[t]he lawyers will now make opening statements.”).
77. MATTHEW STEWART, THE MANAGEMENT MYTH: WHY THE EXPERTS KEEP GETTING IT
WRONG, 197 (W.W. Norton & Co., 2009) (describing how the consulting industry of the 1990s was
always shifting the goalposts with its stream of never-ending and constantly changing theories).
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court’s instruction and argue to the jurors that they must search for
truth, not doubt. And many prosecutors will do this both in their
main argument and again in their rebuttal argument—thus leaving
their “truth trumpet” ringing in the jury’s ears as they begin
deliberations.78
This prosecutorial closing argument to the jury—the inevitable pilingon to the jury instruction’s mandate “not to search for doubt” but “for the
truth”—greatly exacerbates an already serious problem. One trial judge,
a former prosecutor, explains:
During closing arguments, the defense attorney often argues the
burden of proof instruction . . . and then the prosecutor, on rebuttal,
says “Defense counsel read you only part of the jury instruction on
reasonable doubt. What counsel left out were these two lines: ‘you
are not to search for doubt. You are to search for the truth.’”
Prosecutors make this argument because they know that the [jury
instruction] prohibiting the search for doubt diminishes the beyond
a reasonable doubt burden of proof and makes it easier for the State
to obtain a conviction. I have had these lines used against me as a
defense attorney, and mea culpa, mea culpa, I have used them
against defense counsel as district attorney. 79
In sum, to the extent our studies do not precisely mirror real-life jury
trials, as no controlled experiment does, the studies likely underestimated
the burden-lowering effect of the jury instruction’s closing mandate.
D. Attacking the Straw Man
A common prosecutorial trick for nearly any situation is to create an
unpersuasive argument, attribute that argument to the defense lawyer, and
then attack the argument. To illustrate this, consider the defense that the
police were mistaken in their identification of the defendant as the
perpetrator. One prosecutor responded to this defense by arguing to the
jury that “[w]hile defense attorneys try and say, well, we’re not saying the
police are lying; what else are they saying? There’s no other reasonable
explanation, and it kind of frustrates me knowing and working in this field

78. Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1157.
79. Hon. Steven Bauer, Why Wisconsin's Criminal Burden of Proof Instruction Had to be
Changed, TO SPEAK THE TRUTH (Oct. 24, 2017), http://bauersteven.blogspot.com/2017/10/whywisconsins-criminal-burden-of-proof.html (internal footnote, questioning the ethics of this prosecutorial
argument, omitted).
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and knowing these officers; and you know them now too.”80
What the defense lawyer was saying, of course, was perfectly clear: the
police were mistaken. On appeal, the court explained that the prosecutor
was expressing his “self-imposed frustration at his own proposed
suggestion that testifying police officers may have lied.”81 In reality, as
the court recognized, the “defense was mistaken identity,” not police
perjury.82
Prosecutors have also pulled this straw-man tactic out of their bag of
tricks when attacking the two published studies on the burden of proof.
For example, one prosecutor argued that I was claiming Wisconsin’s
reasonable doubt instruction “makes it twice as likely for jurors to convict
defendants.”83 The prosecutor then added that “[i]t is—well—reasonable
to doubt Cicchini’s claims,” and proceeded to attack the claim he had just
attributed to me.84 However, in trying to make my position appear
untenable, the prosecutor misstated the studies’ findings and my claims
about them.
First, in the controlled studies, the conviction rates did not double. In
the original study, the conviction rate nearly doubled when jurors were
told to disregard doubt in favor of a search for the truth.85 In the
conceptual replication—a study that included stronger evidence of the
defendant’s guilt and larger sample sizes of participants—the conviction
rate increased by nearly fifty percent among jurors who received the truthrelated mandate.86 Although the differences were not as great as the
prosecutor’s strategic exaggeration portrayed them to be, both were
statistically significant.87
But second, and more importantly, I have not claimed, nor do the
studies purport to show, that the offending language in the jury instruction
“makes it twice as likely for jurors to convict defendants.”88 There is an
important distinction to be made here. Once again, it centers on a
prosecutor’s confusion between experiments and surveys. Experiments,
such as our two published studies, do not attempt to generalize from a
sample to predict the frequency of a characteristic in the larger
population.89 We even explained this in the first study that the prosecutor
now mischaracterizes. We wrote that “while our findings allow us to
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

State v. Smith, 671 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added).
Id. at 859.
Id.
Griesbach, supra note 67.
Id.
See Part III.
See id.
Cicchini, Report from the Trenches, supra note 33, at 76.
Greisbach, supra note 67.
See Part IV.B.
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conclude that truth-related language diminishes the burden of proof in
criminal cases, we cannot know the extent to which this effect will also
be observed in other cases with different fact patterns.”90
In other words, in real-life cases that have very strong evidence of guilt,
jurors are likely to convict regardless of their burden of proof instruction.
Conversely, in real-life cases that have very weak evidence of guilt, jurors
are likely to acquit regardless of the instruction. And some cases are so
weak that jurors would acquit even if the judge told them that the burden
of proof was on the defense to prove innocence, rather than on the state
to prove guilt.91
Therefore, although we can conclude that the truth-related language we
tested diminishes the state’s burden of proof, precisely how that lower
burden of proof will translate into a higher conviction rate depends
significantly on the types of cases being tried. It is simply not possible to
forecast the extent to which a jury instruction—even an obviously
defective one—will affect real-word conviction rates for future trials
involving yet-to-be-known fact patterns.
Some prosecutors already understand this important distinction, and
therefore spin the facts in the opposite direction. For example, one
prosecutor seized upon the language from our first study—that “we
cannot know the extent to which this effect will also be observed in other
cases”92—and argued that the judge should disregard the studies because
“[e]ven the authors acknowledge that the results could be different in a
case where there is more evidence of guilt.”93
Surprisingly, the prosecutor missed the opportunity to label our
acknowledgment an “admission” or a “concession.” But regardless, the
prosecutor’s claim is yet another red herring. It is true, as explained above,
that the instruction could have a greater or smaller effect (or no effect)
depending upon the strength of the evidence in a given case. However,
that is certainly not a justification for improperly instructing jurors on
reasonable doubt, only to hope they will view the evidence as falling near
one of the two extremes on the strength-of-evidence spectrum (rendering
the defective burden of proof instruction irrelevant to verdict choice).
Rather, the court’s duty is to properly instruct the jury in the first place.94
90. Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1161.
91. This strength of evidence effect has also been observed in numerous controlled studies. For a
review, see Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL. & L. 622 (2001).
92. Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1161.
93. State’s Reply to Defendant’s Motion to Modify Jury Instruction 140, Wisconsin v. Avery, No.
2016-CF-382 (Cir. Ct. Kenosha Cty. 2016), at 5 [hereinafter “State’s Reply”] (on file with the author).
94. See, e.g., State v. Neumann, 832 N.W.2d 560, 584 (Wis. 2013) (“A circuit court must,
however, exercise its discretion in order to fully and fairly inform the jury of the rules of law applicable
to the case and to assist the jury in making a reasonable analysis of the evidence.”).
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E. The Printed Page
As the criticisms pile up, it becomes obvious that prosecutors are not
carefully reading the studies they are condemning. As yet another
example, prosecutors argue that asking mock jurors to make “a decision
about guilt or innocence from nothing more than a few words on a printed
page”—i.e., the written case summary method we used in both studies—
“ensures unreliable results.”95
First, this complaint is ironic, given that this same prosecutor’s office
has no problem convicting real-life defendants by reading “a few words
on a printed page” into the record at trial, in lieu of a live witness. 96
Second, the written case summaries we used were far more than “a few
words,” and are described in detail in each of the studies. And third, this
prosecutorial complaint once again demonstrates willful blindness and
intentional spin doctoring.
As we explained in our first study, not only is the written case summary
method common in controlled experiments, but it also has tremendous
advantages when a researcher is testing the impact of written jury
instructions—as opposed to, say, the physical attractiveness bias, racial
bias, or some other phenomenon—on a verdict.97 We previously
explained:
First, researchers who use the case summary method can eliminate
extrajudicial factors, including race and ethnicity, which may have
an impact on jurors’ decision-making processes. Second, the more
abbreviated case summary method compresses events in time,
thereby reducing the pernicious effect of forgetting, which can also
affect jurors’ decision-making processes. Third, the case summary
method allows researchers to test the impact of a specific component
of a trial—in our study, a particular jury instruction—that may get
lost in the clutter of a more complex trial simulation.98
Or, as one trial judge recently put it, this prosecutorial criticism of the
95. State’s Reply, supra note 93, at 5.
96. See, e.g., State v. Stuart, 2005 WI 47, ¶ 14-15, 695 N.W.2d 259, 263. In Stuart, the prosecutor’s
office filed a mid-trial “emergency petition for review” to permit it to read a preliminary hearing transcript
into evidence at trial. The office won its petition and convicted the defendant at trial based in large part
on “a few words on a printed page”—the very thing it now condemns in the context of controlled
experiments. Fortunately for the real-life defendant in Stuart, his conviction was eventually reversed for
a confrontation clause violation.
97. For a discussion and citation to numerous studies, see Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra
note 24, at 1160-61. See also Michael D. Buhrmester, et al., An Evaluation of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk,
Its Rapid Rise, and Its Effective Use, 13.2 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 149, 149 (2017)
(“thousands of social scientists from seemingly every field have conducted research using the platform.”).
98. Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1161.
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written case summary method is yet another red herring.
[I]t is a red herring because in no way does not using live witnesses
undermine the validity of [the study]. One could have presented live
witnesses, but that would have been a different study. As long as the
variable of the story told in the study was consistent among groups,
how the story is told makes no difference—the differences between
groups would not be biased.99
And as explained earlier, in a controlled experiment (as opposed to a
survey) it is this difference between test groups that is informative.
F. Misrepresentations and Mystery Flaws
As demonstrated in Part IV.D. on straw man arguments, one of the
simplest ways for prosecutors to attack the burden of proof studies is
simply to misrepresent their findings. Making misrepresentations—
whether about the findings or some other aspect of the studies—has two
advantages for prosecutors. First, because misrepresentations are, at best,
only loosely tethered to the facts, they are incredibly easy for prosecutors
to generate but especially time-consuming for defense lawyers to rebut.
And second, when repeated enough times, a misrepresentation—no
matter how far removed from reality—will eventually be accepted as true.
A common prosecutor misrepresentation and argument is that the
studies have not been peer reviewed, i.e. replicated, and therefore, the
judge should continue to use the closing mandate that jurors should search
for truth instead of doubt.100 This prosecutor ploy is flawed in three ways.
First, peer review and study replication are not the same thing and
should not be confused. Peer review simply means that, before a journal
extends an offer of publication, the editors will send the article to one or
more anonymous “peers” outside of the journal to provide comments.
This process has been the subject of much criticism, and the quality of
peer review depends, of course, on the knowledge and effort of the
anonymous reviewers.101 (Prosecutors—who have launched a steady
stream of ad hominem attacks against me since the studies were
published102—would be alarmed to learn that I have been invited to be a

99. Decision Re: Motion, supra note 51, at 6 (emphasis added).
100. See State’s Reply, supra note 93, at 5.
101. See Richard Smith, Peer Review: A Flawed Process at the Heart of Science and Journals, 99
J. ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE 178 (2006); Steven Lubet, Law Review v. Peer Review: A Qualified
Defense of Student Editors, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2017).
102. See Cicchini, Report from the Trenches, supra note 33, at 77-79.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

21

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 4

510

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

reviewer for a peer-reviewed journal on police practices.103) On the other
hand, study replication means that a study has been reproduced—either
directly or conceptually—in a subsequent study, and the findings of the
original study have been supported.104
Second, it is true that, while the University of Richmond journal that
published our original study uses a competitive selection process, it likely
did not solicit peer comments before offering to publish our work.
However, other journals that offered to publish our study may have done
so.105 The Columbia University journal that published our replication
study is not only highly selective but does solicit peer comments.106
Contrary to prosecutors’ claims, our second study was peer reviewed107—
for whatever that is worth. Further, as is obvious from our article’s
subtitle, “a conceptual replication,” the study did replicate the results of
our original work.108
Third, based on these two misrepresentations of fact regarding study
replication and peer review, the prosecutor claims that judges should
preserve the pattern instruction’s truth-related closing mandate. But even
if the prosecutor’s first two claims were true—i.e., if the Richmond study
was not replicated and the Columbia study was not peer reviewed—these
claims still would not lead to the conclusion that the court should maintain
the pattern instruction in its current form. The prosecutor is committing
the fallacy known as “denying the antecedent.”109
This type of logical fallacy resonates with some judges. For example,
in a recent case, a defense lawyer cited the two published studies in
support of his motion to modify the pattern jury instruction. After oral
103. E-mail from Robert D. Hanser, Ph.D., Associate Managing Editor, POLICE PRACTICE AND
RESEARCH: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL (Feb. 3, 2015, 11:04 a.m. C.S.T.) (“I would be grateful if you
would kindly agree to act as a reviewer”) (on file with the author).
104. Study replication is highly desirable, but relatively rare. See Benedict Carey, Many Psychology
Findings Not as Strong as Claimed, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/science/many-social-science-findings-not-as-strong-as-claimedstudy-says.html.
105. Law review articles are submitted to multiple journals simultaneously, and we received offers
to publish our study from the American Criminal Law Review, the Florida Law Review, and the NYU Law
Review Online, among others. Several offers of publication are on file with the author.
106. COLUM. L. REV., SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS: PEER REVIEW (“Because peer review of articles
and essays improves the Columbia Law Review’s selection process and helps to verify piece originality,
the Review strongly prefers subjecting submitted pieces to peer review, contingent on piece-selection
timeframes and other extenuating circumstances.”), http://columbialawreview.org/submissionsinstructions/.
107. E-mail from Shu-en Wee, Former Editor, COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE (July 11, 2017, 08:28 a.m.
CST) (“your piece was reviewed by one professor before an offer was extended.”) (on file with author).
108. See Part III. Further, we conducted a conceptual replication, rather than a direct replication, in
part to address the prosecutorial criticism that the results could be different in cases involving more
evidence of the defendant’s guilt. See Part IV.D.
109. See D.Q. MCINERY, BEING LOGICAL: A GUIDE TO GOOD THINKING 104-05 (Random House:
2004).
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argument, the judge in that case said he was not persuaded by the studies
and therefore, was denying the motion.110 The judge then added,
“Frankly, Mr. [defense lawyer], I think you can just ask [to modify the
jury instruction] without going through the statistical stuff, I would
probably be more inclined to grant it.”111 This is fallacious reasoning. As
my coauthor and I explained:
It is clearly illogical to assert that an argument has merit per se but
will be rejected because the meritorious argument is also supported
by empirical data. Even if the studies had contained some
methodological weaknesses . . . none of that should cause a judge to
pivot 180-degrees and deny a motion he would otherwise be inclined
to grant.112
Finally, when prosecutors are unable to fabricate a specific flaw in the
studies, they simply resort to unidentifiable mystery flaws. For example,
as discussed in Part IV.A., one prosecutor claimed our studies were biased
because we formulated a hypothesis. He then claimed that “[t]his initial
bias likely affected both the way the study was conducted and the way the
results were construed.”113 Fortunately, the trial judge in that case
explained the flaw in the prosecutor’s thinking.
The State’s statement that[] ‘[t]his initial bias likely affected both
the way the study was conducted and the way the results were
construed’ is less than persuasive. The State provides [neither]
evidence nor argument of how bias affected how the study was
conducted or the presentation of the results. The study was
apparently biased because the State says it was biased. The Court is
generally highly skeptical of ipse dixit arguments and refuses to
accept it on this topic.114
Worse, some prosecutors take these unidentified mystery flaws to the
next level. After our first published study, I notified my state’s jury
instruction committee of our findings and requested that it delete the truth-

110. The judge actually made several factual and logical errors en route to denying the defense
lawyer’s motion. See Motion Hearing Transcript, Wisconsin v. Soppa, No. 16-CM-940 (Cir. Ct. Eau
Claire Cty. 2016) (on file with the author).
111. Id. at 18.
112. Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Educating Judges and Lawyers in Behavioral
Research: A Case Study, 53 GONZAGA L. REV. 159, 180 (2017-18) [hereinafter Cicchini & White, Case
Study].
113. Decision Re: Motion, supra note 51, at 2.
114. Id. at 3-4.
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related closing mandate from the burden of proof instruction.115 With the
amendment, the lengthy instruction would simply conclude: “It is your
duty to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt.”116
The committee—which, at that time, had ten active members and was
comprised of seven former prosecutors and two former government
attorneys in other capacities117—declined to change the instruction. So
now, when defense lawyers cite the study to persuade individual trialcourt judges to modify the instruction on a case-by-case basis, prosecutors
have responded: “[t]hat study has very serious flaws in it, flaws that
recently led the Jury Instruction Committee to reject the proposed
change.”118 However, the prosecutors who make this claim never identify
any of the “very serious flaws” that purportedly led to the committee’s
decision. Prosecutors are unable to do so because the committee never
identified a single flaw, serious or otherwise, in the studies.119
These prosecutor arguments sound superficially appealing even though
they have no basis in reality and further, are often contradicted by the
known facts. Once again, much like landmines, such claims are easy to
lay, but difficult to cleanup.
G. Appeals to Authority
As previously discussed, prosecutors urge trial judges to defer to the
jury instruction committee because, although the committee offered no
criticisms of the studies, it still denied the request to delete the
instruction’s truth-related mandate. In their attempts to build-up the
credibility of the committee, prosecutors have made additional
misrepresentations.
Much like the prosecutor who complained that the studies
simultaneously used, and did not use, random sampling, other prosecutors
are throwing inconsistent (and false) claims against the same
metaphorical wall. For example, one prosecutor urged a trial court to use
the pattern jury instructions because the committee that drafted it was

115. Michael D. Cicchini, Letter to Jury Wisconsin Instruction Committee (June 7, 2016),
http://www.cicchinilawoffice.com/uploads/JI_com._letter.pdf (last visited June 11, 2018).
116. Id.
117. Cicchini, Report from the Trenches, supra note 33, at 85-87.
118. State’s Reply, supra note 93, at 5.
119. See E-mail from David Schultz, Reporter, Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee
(June
29,
2017,
11:19
a.m.
CST),
http://www.cicchinilawoffice.com/uploads/Letter_from_JI_Committee.pdf (last visited June 11, 2018)
(stating only that “[t]he committee’s reasoning . . . is reflected in footnote 5 in the attached version of JI
140”); WIS. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 140 (2017), n. 5 (offering no comment on, or criticism
of, the studies, but concluding that, “[a]fter careful consideration, the Committee decided not to change
the text of the instruction.”).
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comprised of “a cross-sector [sic] of the legal bar.”120 Another prosecutor,
however, urged the trial court to follow the committee’s lead because it is
comprised of specialists—“an eminently qualified committee of legal
experts.”121 Both claims are false.
The committee, in its 2018 iteration, is comprised of eleven judges. 122
Eight of the eleven members are former prosecutors, and many were
career-long prosecutors until they took the bench.123 Four of the
committee members each have more than twenty years of experience
putting citizens behind bars; another three each boast more than a
decade’s worth of such experience.124 Of the three committee members
who haven’t worked as prosecutors, all have worked as government
lawyers in other capacities, including quasi-prosecutorial positions.125
While two of the eleven members have also reported working in “private
practice,” it is not clear whether they have ever defended a client against
the government.126
Quite obviously, this is not a cross-section of the bar. Unlike other
states, it does not include any defense lawyers, criminal law professors,
or anyone else from any other part of the legal community. 127 More
importantly, it is not an “eminently qualified committee of legal experts.”
Rather, it is a group of former prosecutors. In fact, according to the litmus
test set by the prosecutor who claimed they are “eminently qualified,”
these judges should be completely disqualified from drafting a burden of

120. Letter to Trial Court Judge, Wisconsin v. Griesbach, No. 16-CM-630 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee Cty.
2016) (on file with the author). As far as I can tell, the prosecutor meant to write “cross-section” instead
of “cross-sector.”
121. State’s Reply, supra note 93, at 4.
122. WISCONSIN JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OFFICERS AND STANDING COMMITTEES, WISCONSIN
COURT SYSTEM (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/committees/docs/judconflist.pdf.
123. The website www.ballotpedia.org has “an editorial staff of over 60 writers and researchers” to
collect and report information on elected officials, including the elected trial court judges that are
subsequently appointed to Wisconsin’s Criminal Jury Instruction Committee. It reports that Judges Boyle,
Dallet, Eagon, Hanrahan, Horne, Metropulos, Reynolds, and Rothstein are all former prosecutors, with
many of them being career-long prosecutors before taking the bench and joining the committee. (This is
not to say that every single one of the committee’s former prosecutors necessarily opposed the change.
Members of the defense bar have reported to me that judges Hanrahan and Metropulos have, in their
courtrooms, each modified the pattern jury instruction in one or more cases at the request of defense
counsel.)
124. Id. Judges Eagon, Horne, Metropulous, and Rothstein each have twenty or more years of
experience stripping citizens of their liberty. (Again, members of the defense bar have reported to me that
judge Metropulos has, in his courtroom, modified the pattern jury instruction in one or more cases at the
request of defense counsel.)
125. Id. Judge Rosa, for example, worked in “child support enforcement.”
126. Id. Judges Ehlers and Reynolds have experience in “private practice”; Reynolds was also a
former prosecutor.
127. In the state of Washington, for example, the “pattern instructions are drafted and approved by
a committee that includes judges, law professors, and practicing attorneys.” State v. Bennett, 165 P.3d
1241, 1243 (Wash. 2007).
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proof instruction.
More specifically, the prosecutor, like many prosecutors, urged the
judge to reject the two published studies on the burden of proof because I
am a criminal defense lawyer. The prosecutor wrote: “[t]he State objects
to this court’s reliance on a biased study commissioned, designed, and
executed by a criminal defense attorney.” 128 Similarly, another prosecutor
wrote: “the fact it was conducted by a criminal defense attorney seriously
calls into question the validity of [the] study.”129 Attacking me is, by far,
the most common prosecutorial criticism of the published research. And
if my employment is a disqualifying factor, then the jury instruction
committee members, as former prosecutors, should also be
disqualified.130
I have explained elsewhere that this amateurish prosecutorial attack on
my profession is an invalid form of argument known as the ad hominem
fallacy.131 So instead of criticizing the committee because it is comprised
almost entirely of former prosecutors, we must instead look to the
committee’s reasons for its decision. However, as explained in the
previous Part, the committee has not offered a single criticism of the
studies and has not given a single reason why they should be rejected.
Rather, all this group of former prosecutors has done is cite two very old,
off point cases.132
The problem with the committee’s response is that jury instruction
committees are “charged with providing trial courts with instructions that
are concise, understandable and accurate.”133 They are not charged with
blindly following or desperately clinging to old case law. Both cases cited
by the committee predate the published research by several decades—one
case is nearly a century old and has nothing to do with burden of proof
128. State’s Reply, supra note 93, at 5.
129. This quotation is taken from a prosecutor’s written opposition to a defense lawyer’s motion to
modify the burden of proof jury instruction. However, the defense attorney that gave me the document
has not given me permission to cite the source. Arguably, that defense attorney would be required to first
obtain consent to do so from the former client, even though the source is a public document. See Michael
D. Cicchini, On the Absurdity of Model Rule 1.9, 40 VT L. REV. 69 (2015) (discussing the absurdity of
the ethics rule that arguably prohibits attorneys from discussing or sharing even the public aspects of their
closed cases).
130. I realize the distinction between current employment and former employment. However, I have
no doubt that if I were to retire from practicing law, but continued to publish, prosecutors would still
criticize my yet-to-be-published work as being written by a former criminal defense attorney.
131. See Cicchini, Report from the Trenches, supra note 33, at 77-79; Cicchini & White, Case
Study, supra note 112, at 165-66.
132. See WIS. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 140 (2017), n. 5.
133. Model Crim. Jury Instructions, MICHIGAN COURTS: ONE COURT OF JUSTICE,
http://courts.mi.gov/courts/michigansupremecourt/criminal-jury-instructions/pages/default.aspx
(last
visited June 13, 2018). I can find no such charge for Wisconsin’s committee, which appears to have no
accountability to anyone, but I suspect even the former prosecutors that comprise the committee would
have to concede that this should be their objective.
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jury instructions134 and the other is nearly twenty-five years old.135
Further, the two cases cited by the committee have not held that the
truth-related language in the jury instruction is accurate or even desirable,
let alone required. Rather, the cases have merely upheld defendants’
convictions because, the courts claimed, the offending truth-related
language probably did not lower the burden of proof when considered in
the context of the entire instruction.136 But such dated commentary has
now (twice) been empirically tested and debunked.137
The prosecutors’ deference to the jury instruction committee is
therefore flawed in two ways. First, the committee members are not
experts. Second, even if they were experts, they have offered no reasons
in support of their decision to preserve the instructions’ burden-lowering
closing mandate. By contrast, my coauthor—a research psychologist with
a Ph.D.—and I have conducted and published two empirical studies. We
offer data, analysis, and arguments to support our conclusions. This is
important, of course, because “[t]he strongest kind of expert evidence
incorporates the reasons the experts advance for holding a certain
position.”138
Prosecutors, on the other hand, are urging judges to accept the decision
of a group of former prosecutors because this group is allegedly
“eminently qualified.” Such reliance on expertise—even in situations that
involve actual experts—is another form of fallacious reasoning. The
prosecutors are merely saying: the committee members are experts, we
like the committee members, so “[d]on’t ask any questions, just do as we
say.”139
From the perspective of individual trial judges, not only is this unsound
reasoning, but it conflicts with every trial judge’s duty to exercise his or
her own discretion in properly instructing the jury on the burden of proof.
As one trial judge wrote, even though the pro-state, pattern jury
instructions have been blessed by a committee:
The Court can’t close its eye to the fact that people have been
wrongfully convicted [and then] later exonerated after serving many
years in prison. The Court can’t close its eye to empirical evidence
134. See Manna v. State, 192 N.W. 160 (1923). This case does not involve the burden of proof
instruction, but rather the court’s instruction to the jury on how to resolve disputes of fact when conflicting
evidence is presented. For further discussion, see Cicchini, Report from the Trenches, supra note 33, at
99-100.
135. See State v. Avila, 532 N.W.2d 423 (Wis. 1995).
136. Id. at 429-30. The other cited case, Manna, did not even involve a burden of proof jury
instruction.
137. See Part III.
138. McInery, supra note 109, at 117 (emphasis added).
139. Id.
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that may help the criminal justice system be more accurate in
discerning guilt from innocence, and be more faithful to the stricture
of the Constitution of the United States requiring a criminal charge
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.140
Fortunately, at least twenty other trial court judges have agreed with him
and have made some modification to the defective burden of proof jury
instruction.141
H. Equivocation
The last piece of prosecutorial spin does not concern the two published
studies per se, but rather the broader concept of the burden of proof. One
prosecutor recently argued that the jury instruction’s closing mandate
“not to search for doubt” but instead “to search for the truth” is preferable
because “it directs the jury to a neutral objective, finding the truth, rather
than directing them to look for evidence that supports the position of
either of the parties—the position of the State to find guilt or the position
of the defendant to find doubt.”142 This argument is flawed in two ways.
First, there is nothing neutral about a jury’s job. The Constitution
requires jurors to presume the defendant’s innocence, which “is not a
mere slogan but an essential part of the law that is binding upon you.” 143
Then, only after deliberations and upon a unanimous finding that the
evidence eliminated all reasonable doubt may the jurors convict. That is,
“[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that fully satisfies or entirely
convinces you of the defendant’s guilt.”144 The prosecutor’s “neutral
objective” argument completely ignores these constitutional imperatives.
The prosecutor does not realize it, but by making this argument—that the
instruction points the jury to a neutral objective instead of ordering it to
scrutinize the state’s case for reasonable doubt—she is conceding that the
closing mandate lowers the state’s burden of proof.
Second, aside from this constitutional issue, the prosecutor is
committing the fallacy of equivocation: she is “employ[ing] words with
multiple meanings for the purpose of deception.”145 Her “neutral
objective” argument portrays the “search for the truth” as a middle-of-

140. Decision Re: Motion, supra note 51, at 1-2 (emphasis added).
141. See
WIS.
J.I.
140
RESOURCE
PAGE
FOR
LAWYERS,
http://www.cicchinilawoffice.com/Wis_JI_140.html (listing judges and linking to public court records, a
written order, and a written decision).
142. State’s Reply, supra note 93, at 6 (emphasis added).
143. HAW. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 3.02 (2014).
144. N.C. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 101.10 (2008).
145. McInery, supra note 109, at 107.
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the-road alternative to which neither party lays claim. But in reality, the
jury instruction and prosecutorial closing argument uses the phrase
“search for the truth” in a dramatically different and one-sided way. After
the defense lawyer argues that there is doubt about guilt, the prosecutor
argues (parroting the judge’s instruction) that the jury must not search for
doubt, but for the truth. The prosecutor then, of course, equates “truth”
with a finding of guilt. As one court recognized, telling the jury to search
for truth instead of doubt is not neutral, but rather “impermissibly
portray[s] the reasonable doubt standard as a defense tool for hiding the
truth.”146
By arguing that the truth-not-doubt mandate provides the jury with a
neutral option, and then asserting that this allegedly neutral option passes
constitutional muster, prosecutors are demonstrating that their sophistry
knows no limits when a conviction is at stake.
I. Other Spin Revisited
When it comes to the burden of proof, prosecutorial spin is unrelenting.
The arguments debunked in this Article are just the latest—although
arguably the most interesting—in the constant stream of sophistry that
began even before the studies were published.
Previously debunked prosecutor arguments include (1) other
misstatements regarding legal authority, 147 (2) claims based on the
language of the jury instruction,148 (3) misrepresentations about the
purpose of the modern jury trial,149 and (4) other attacks on the published
studies.150 Defense counsel who challenge truth-related language in a
burden of proof instruction, or in a prosecutor’s closing argument, should
become familiar with all of these versions of prosecutorial spin.
V. The Big Picture
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest burden of proof
146. State v. Berube, 286 P.3d 402, 411 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added); see also Avila,
532 N.W.2d at 429 (defendant argued that the instruction would lead the jury to believe “that finding
doubt would mean not finding the truth”). A more common example of equivocation is when prosecutors
toy with the word “reasonable.” For example, a prosecutor may first use it to discuss “reasonable doubt,”
but then subtly shift gears and use it improperly to argue that because the state’s theory of guilt is
“reasonable,” conviction is proper or even required. See Bobby Green, Reasonable Doubt: Is it Defined
by Whatever is at the Top of the Google Page?, 50 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 933, 944-45 (2017) (discussing
People v. Cole, 2015 IL App (3d) 120992-U at ¶ 27, and arguing that the prosecutor in that case “was
trying to play on the word ‘reasonable’”).
147. See Cicchini, Report from the Trenches, supra note 33, at 80-87.
148. Id. at 88-93.
149. Id. at 93-102.
150. Id. at 71-80; Cicchini & White, Case Study, supra note 112.
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recognized in the American legal system, and constitutional due process
requires its application in cases where a defendant’s life, liberty, and
property are in jeopardy. It has long been obvious—from the standpoint
of linguistics, logic, and commonsense—that when a judge instructs
jurors on reasonable doubt but then tells them to search for the truth (or,
worse yet, not to search for doubt), such tacked-on language will only
lower the burden of proof below the constitutionally-mandated standard.
As one former prosecutor, now judge, has stated: prosecutors love the
truth-versus-doubt language “because they know that the [jury
instruction] prohibiting the search for doubt diminishes the beyond a
reasonable doubt burden of proof and makes it easier for the State to
obtain a conviction.”151 This is why prosecutors are fighting so vigorously
to preserve the offending language. If the closing mandate did not lower
the burden of proof, they would not oppose its deletion.
The burden-lowering effect of this truth-versus-doubt language is not
only intuitive, but has now been demonstrated empirically. Consider the
second of the two published studies—the peer-reviewed, conceptual
replication study.152 Now consider the simplicity of its design: (1) mock
jurors in Group 1 received a standard reasonable doubt instruction; and
(2) mock jurors in Group 2 received the identical instruction but with the
tacked-on, closing mandate “not to search for doubt” but “to search for
the truth.”153
Now consider its two simplest findings. When asked in a post-verdict
multiple choice question to describe their jury instruction, mock jurors in
Group 2 were nearly twice as likely (28% compared to 15%) to
mistakenly believe that conviction was proper even if they had a
reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt.154 Further, jurors who held
this mistaken belief, regardless of the instruction they received, convicted
the defendant at a rate nearly two and one half times (54% compared to
21%) that of those who correctly understood the burden of proof.155
This is clear, simple, and unsurprising empirical evidence in a peer
reviewed study. Yet, as this Article has demonstrated, prosecutors
continue to spin (and even fabricate) information, making outlandish
arguments in an effort to preserve the burden-lowering language on which
they rely to get convictions. In doing so, they have demonstrated—
contrary to their duties as ministers of justice156—that they have no regard

151. Hon. Steven Bauer, supra note 79.
152. Cicchini & White, Conceptual Replication, supra note 44.
153. Id. at 29-30.
154. Id. at 32. This difference is statistically significant, p = 0.01, which means we can be 99%
certain [1-p] that this difference did not occur by chance.
155. Id. With p < .001, we can be even more confident that this difference did not occur by chance.
156. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 3.8, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
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for the truth, while, at the same time, demanding inclusion of that word
in the reasonable doubt jury instruction.
When linguistics, logic, commonsense, and empirical evidence align,
judges can no longer use burden-lowering language in their jury
instructions, and they should not permit prosecutors to use such language
in their closing arguments to the jury. And if prosecutorial spin creates
confusion about the empirical research, judges should focus on the big
picture using these three simple steps.
First, even if the empirical evidence is flawed—or even if the studies
did not exist at all—the constitutionally-mandated burden is still proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, the jury’s duty, therefore, is to
examine the evidence for reasonable doubt in order to determine if the
state has met its high burden. And third, any jury instruction language or
prosecutorial argument that directs jurors to do otherwise—or implies or
even hints that they should do otherwise—is constitutionally defective
and must not be tolerated.
CONCLUSION
Empirical evidence now demonstrates that truth-related language in
reasonable doubt jury instructions diminishes the burden of proof below
the constitutionally-mandated standard.157 Prosecutors, however, have
shifted their spin machines into high gear to discredit the published
studies and preserve the truth-based instructions on which they rely.158
This Article has identified and debunked eight new prosecutorial
arguments regarding the published research and the burden of proof.
First, formulating a hypothesis that truth-related language will increase
conviction rates is not bias. Rather, hypothesis formulation is the first step
in scientific inquiry. Another step is testing the hypothesis. The null
hypothesis—that conviction rates will not be affected—must be
overcome by statistically significant evidence before the alternative
hypothesis is accepted. In both published studies, mock jurors who were
told “not to search for doubt” but “to search for the truth” convicted at
significantly higher rates than those who were properly instructed on
reasonable doubt.159
Second, random sampling is important for surveys. However, in
controlled experiments, researchers control for participant bias by using
random assignment of participants to test groups. This creates groups that
are statistically equivalent to each other in all respects, thus allowing
researchers to conclude that observed differences are attributable to the
157. See Part III.
158. See Part IV.
159. See Part IV.A.
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variable being tested—in our case, jury instruction language—rather than
the personal characteristics of the test participants.160
Third, with regard to the number of “truth” and “doubt” references in
the test materials, participants were instructed almost exactly as real-life
jurors would have been. Further, as we explained in our first study, our
design was intentionally conservative and therefore, probably
underestimates the burden-lowering effect of telling jurors “not to search
for doubt” but instead “to search for the truth.”161
Fourth, in real-life cases involving very weak or very strong evidence
of guilt, the truth-related language in the burden of proof instruction may
have little or no effect on verdicts, i.e., jurors will acquit or convict
regardless of the instruction. However, this is not a reason to reject the
studies’ findings. Judges are duty-bound to properly instruct jurors on the
burden of proof. They must not provide a defective instruction and then
hope that the evidence falls near one of the two extremes on the strengthof-evidence spectrum, thus rendering the instruction moot.162
Fifth, our experiments used the case summary method, i.e., participants
read a written case summary, rather than watching a video, before
rendering their verdicts. This method is commonly used in published
research and is especially well-suited for testing written jury instructions.
Further, as long as the different test groups received the same information
in the same format—regardless of whether it was print or video—it is the
difference between groups that is informative. In other words, all else
being equal, did participants who received instruction A convict at a
higher rate than those who received instruction B?163
Sixth, prosecutors frequently claim that the studies have not been peer
reviewed, i.e., replicated. However, peer review is not the same as study
replication. Further, contrary to prosecutors’ claims, the findings of the
first study were replicated by the second study, and this second study was
also peer reviewed. But even if the first study had not been replicated in
a subsequent, peer reviewed study—or even if the studies had some other
unidentified flaws—it would be a logical fallacy (known as “denying the
antecedent”) to use this to conclude that the burden-lowering, truthrelated language should be preserved.164
Seventh, prosecutors frequently commit the ad hominem fallacy by
attacking the studies’ author, and then arguing that the studies are
therefore invalid. Prosecutors compound this logical error with a second
fallacy: an appeal to authority. They claim the truth-related language
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See Part IV.B.
See Part IV.C.
See Part IV.D.
See Part IV.E.
See Part IV.F.
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should be persevered because it was approved by an eminently qualified
committee of experts. However, this committee of former prosecutors has
no particular expertise. More importantly, the committee offers no
reasons for its decision and no criticisms of the studies. To invoke this
committee as an authority on the matter is merely to plead: “[d]on’t ask
any questions, just do as [they] say.” 165
Eighth, prosecutors claim that judges should instruct jurors to search
for the truth instead of doubt because that is a neutral objective. Not only
does this violate the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof,
but it incorporates yet another logical fallacy: equivocation. That is, when
making this argument to the trial judge, prosecutors claim that “search for
the truth” is neutral; however, when arguing to the jury, prosecutors use
“search for the truth” to paint the reasonable doubt standard “as a defense
tool for hiding the truth.”166
Finally, empirical evidence aside, judges should always keep the big
picture in mind. The Constitution requires the state to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Any language—whether in a jury instruction or the
prosecutor’s closing argument—that suggests or even hints otherwise is a
blatant constitutional error.167

165. See Part IV.G.
166. See Part IV.H.
167. See Part V.
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